The game is a prototype of the social contract. [11] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier, June 2017, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Advanced%20Electronics/Our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx: 5 (estimating major tech companies in 2016 spent $20-30 billion on AI development and acquisitions). %PDF-1.7 % . trailer Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game - Nature Robert J Aumann, "Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing," in Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation (Essays in Honor of Jacques Dreze), edited by J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. In these abstractions, we assume two utility-maximizing actors with perfect information about each others preferences and behaviors. The ongoing U.S. presence in Afghanistan not only enables the increasingly capable Afghan National Security Forces to secure more of their homeland, but it also serves as a very important political signal. Landing The Job You Want Through YourNetwork, Earth Day: Using game theory and AI to beat thepoachers, Adopting to Facebooks new Like Alternative. Economic Theory of Networks at Temple University, Economic theory of networks course discussion. [7] Aumann concluded that in this game "agreement has no effect, one way or the other." > Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Image: The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division at the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. Before getting to the theory, I will briefly examine the literature on military technology/arms racing and cooperation. This can be facilitated, for example, by a state leader publicly and dramatically expressing understanding of danger and willingness to negotiate with other states to achieve this. [51] An analogous scenario in the context of the AI Coordination Problem could be if both international actors have developed, but not yet unleashed an ASI, where knowledge of whether the technology will be beneficial or harmful is still uncertain. The hedge is shared so both parties are responsible for maintaining it. By failing to agree to a Coordination Regime at all [D,D], we can expect the chance of developing a harmful AI to be highest as both actors are sparing in applying safety precautions to development. This subsection looks at the four predominant models that describe the situation two international actors might find themselves in when considering cooperation in developing AI, where research and development is costly and its outcome is uncertain. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X One final strategy that a safety-maximizing actor can employ in order to maximize chances for cooperation is to change the type of game that exists by using strategies or policies to affect the payoff variables in play. [52] In the context of developing an AI Coordination Regime, recognizing that two competing actors are in a state of Deadlock might drive peace-maximizing individuals to pursue de-escalation strategies that differ from other game models. 0000018184 00000 n Additional readings provide insight on arms characteristics that impact race dynamics. One significant limitation of this theory is that it assumes that the AI Coordination Problem will involve two key actors. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. [47] look at different policy responses to arms race de-escalation and find that the model or game that underlies an arms race can affect the success of policies or strategies to mitigate or end the race. Beding (2008), but also in international relations (Jervis 1978) and macroeconomics (Bryant 1994). The matrix above provides one example. 'The "liberal democratic peace" thesis puts the nail into the coffin of Kenneth Waltz's claim that wars are principally caused by the anarchical nature of the international system.' Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People In so doing, they have maintained a kind of limited access order, drawing material and political benefits from cooperating with one another, most recently as part of the current National Unity Government. War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. This is expressed in the following way: The intuition behind this is laid out in Armstrong et al.s Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence.[55] The authors suggest each actor would be incentivized to skimp on safety precautions in order to attain the transformative and powerful benefits of AI before an opponent. As discussed, there are both great benefits and harms to developing AI, and due to the relevance AI development has to national security, it is likely that governments will take over this development (specifically the US and China). The Stag Hunt The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. This same dynamic could hold true in the development of an AI Coordination Regime, where actors can decide whether to abide by the Coordination Regime or find a way to cheat. In biology many circumstances that have been described as prisoner's dilemma might also be interpreted as a stag hunt, depending on how fitness is calculated. In this example, each player has a dominantstrategy. Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources Jean-Jacques Rousseau described a situation in which two individuals go out on a hunt. Payoff matrix for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. In the context of international relations, this model has been used to describe preferences of actors when deciding to enter an arms treaty or not. One example payoff structure that results in a Prisoners Dilemma is outlined in Table 7. (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). This is what I will refer to as the AI Coordination Problem. 714 0 obj I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. Downs et al. Use integration to find the indicated probabilities. In game theory, the stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. This means that it remains in U.S. interests to stay in the hunt for now, because, if the game theorists are right, that may actually be the best path to bringing our troops home for good. The Stag Hunt UCI School of Social Sciences, Example of stag hunt in international relations, on Example of stag hunt in international relations, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stag_Hunt_Mosaic, example of application letter for sales representative, Example of selection criteria planning and organising, Example sentences with the word detrimental, Manual de access 2010 avanzado pdf en espanol gratis. Those in favor of withdrawal are skeptical that a few thousand U.S. troops can make a decisive difference when 100,000 U.S. soldiers proved incapable of curbing the insurgency. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI. In the Prisoner's dilemma, defect is a dominant strategy and only the bad outcome is possible. [40] Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30, 2 (1978): 167-214. The Stag Hunt Game: An Example of an Excel-Based Probabilistic Game However, the interest of the state has continued to overshadow the interest of the people. Table 4. b In the US, the military and intelligence communities have a long-standing history of supporting transformative technological advancements such as nuclear weapons, aerospace technology, cyber technology and the Internet, and biotechnology. These two concepts refer to how states will act in the international community. As described in the previous section, this arms race dynamic is particularly worrisome due to the existential risks that arise from AIs development and call for appropriate measures to mitigate it. These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. [27] An academic survey conducted showed that AI experts and researchers believe there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years. Leanna Litsch, Kabul Security Force Public Affairs. Stag Hunt - Game Theory .net To reiterate, the primary function of this theory is to lay out a structure for identifying what game models best represent the AI Coordination Problem, and as a result, what strategies should be applied to encourage coordination and stability. endstream endobj 12 0 obj <>stream December 5, 2010 at 2:49 pm. Payoff variables for simulated Chicken game. First-move advantage will be decisive in determining the winner of the race due to the expected exponential growth in capabilities of an AI system and resulting difficulty of other parties to catch up. International Relations, The reason is because the traditional PD game does not fully capture the strategic options and considerations available to each player. [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). Together, the likelihood of winning and the likelihood of lagging = 1. Such a Coordination Regime could also exist in either a unilateral scenario where one team consisting of representatives from multiple states develops AI together or a multilateral scenario where multiple teams simultaneously develop AI on their own while agreeing to set standards and regulations (and potentially distributive arrangements) in advance. Despite the damage it could cause, the impulse to go it alone has never been far off, given the profound uncertainties that define the politics of any war-torn country. 0000002790 00000 n This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. In each of these models, the payoffs can be most simply described as the anticipated benefit from developing AI minus the anticipated harm from developing AI. The United States is in the hunt, too. hRj0pq%[a00a IIR~>jzNTDLC=Qm=,e-[Vi?kCE"X~5eyE]/2z))!6fqfx6sHD8&: s>)Mg 5>6v9\s7U Table 8. Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the actors perceived likelihood that such a regime would create a harmful AI expressed as P_(h|A) (AB)for Actor A and P_(h|B) (AB)for Actor B times each actors perceived harm expressed as hA and hB. It is the goal this paper to shed some light on these, particularly how the structure of preferences that result from states understandings of the benefits and harms of AI development lead to varying prospects for coordination. Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. Uncategorized, Mail (will not be published) As a result, concerns have been raised that such a race could create incentives to skimp on safety. 2 Examples of states include the United States, Germany, China, India, Bolivia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. \wb94W(F}pYY"[17/x(K+jf+M)S_3ZP7~Nj\TgTId=/o7Mx{a[ K} 201-206. Stag hunt - Wikipedia At the same time, a growing literature has illuminated the risk that developing AI has of leading to global catastrophe[4] and further pointed out the effect that racing dynamics has on exacerbating this risk. In this book, you will make an introduction to realism, liberalism and economic structuralism as major traditions in the field, their historical evolution and some theories they have given birth . Some observers argue that a precipitous American retreat will leave the countryand even the capital, Kabulvulnerable to an emboldened, undeterred Taliban given the limited capabilities of Afghanistans national security forces. Also, trade negotiations might be better thought of as an iterated game the game is played repeatedly and the nations interact with each other more than once over time. Based on the values that each actor assigns to their payoff variables, we can expect different coordination models (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) to arise. As of 2017, there were 193 member-states of the international system as recognized by the United Nations. The Stag-hunt is probably more useful since games in life have many equilibria, and its a question of how you can get to the good ones. On the face of it, the USSR Swerved, but I believe that both sides actually made concessions, although the US made theirs later on, to save face. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. Nash Equilibrium Examples Although Section 2 describes to some capacity that this might be a likely event with the U.S. and China, it is still conceivable that an additional international actor can move into the fray and complicate coordination efforts. This is visually represented in Table 4 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. 1. <> 0000004572 00000 n Payoff variables for simulated Deadlock, Table 10. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. [50] This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. This table contains a sample ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Stag Hunt game. September 21, 2015 | category: Namely, the probability of developing a harmful AI is greatest in a scenario where both actors defect, while the probability of developing a harmful AI is lowest in a scenario where both actors cooperate. Actor As preference order: CC > DC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CC > CD > DD > DC. a [15] Sam Byford, AlphaGo beats Lee Se-dol again to take Google DeepMind Challenge series, The Verge, March 12, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/12/11210650/alphago-deepmind-go-match-3-result. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. Deadlock is a common if little studied occurrence in international relations, although knowledge about how deadlocks are solved can be of practical and theoretical importance. [39] D. S. Sorenson, Modeling the Nuclear Arms Race: A Search for Stability, Journal of Peace Science 4 (1980): 16985. [52] Stefan Persson, Deadlocks in International Negotiation, Cooperation and Conflict 29, 3(1994): 211244. Using Game Theory to Claim Advantage in Negotiations - Kogan Page 0000001656 00000 n The Afghan Stag Hunt - Lawfare We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag -hunters . [32] Notably, discussions among U.S. policymakers to block Chinese investment in U.S. AI companies also began at this time.[33]. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. [6], Aumann proposed: "Let us now change the scenario by permitting pre-play communication. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. NUMBER OF PAGES 65 14. Next, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. 15. [38] Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, Formal Models of Arms Races, Journal of Peace Science 2, 1(1976): 7788. Any individual move to capture a rabbit will guarantee a small meal for the defector but ensure the loss of the bigger, shared bounty. How do strategies of non-violent resistance view power differently from conventional 'monolithic' understandings of power? to Be Made in China by 2030, The New York Times, July 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, [33] Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence., [34] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier.. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Chicken game. This table contains a representation of a payoff matrix. [3] While (Hare, Hare) remains a Nash equilibrium, it is no longer risk dominant. International Relations of Asia & US Foreign Policy. Outline a basic understanding of what the discipline of International Relations is about, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778): Parable of the Stag Hunt. Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. For instance, if the expected punishment is 2, then the imposition of this punishment turns the above prisoner's dilemma into the stag hunt given at the introduction. In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Payoff variables for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. . (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? Solving this problem requires more understanding of its dynamics and strategic implications before hacking at it with policy solutions. In international relations, countries are the participants in the stag hunt. <<3B74F05AAAB3B2110A0010B6ACF6FC7F>]/Prev 397494>> Whereas the short-term impact of AI depends on who controls it, the long-term impact depends now whether it can be controlled at all.[26]. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistan's internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. But, after nearly two decades of participation in the countrys fledgling democratic politics, economic reconstruction and security-sector development, many of these strongmen have grown invested in the Afghan states survival and the dividends that they hope will come with greater peace and stability. Weiss and Agassi wrote about this argument: "This we deem somewhat incorrect since it is an oversight of the agreement that may change the mutual expectations of players that the result of the game depends on Aumanns assertion that there is no a priori reason to expect agreement to lead to cooperation requires completion; at times, but only at times, there is a posteriori reason for that How a given player will behave in a given game, thus, depends on the culture within which the game takes place".[8]. This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. The coincident timing of high-profile talks with a leaked report that President Trump seeks to reduce troop levels by half has already triggered a political frenzy in Kabul. In a security dilemma, each state cannot trust the other to cooperate. (5OP,&|#5Y9/yU'4x r+g\t97ASNgQ+Oh iCcKzCx7<=nZefYt|.OPX:'.&|=_Ml_I{]+Mr`h+9UeovX.C; =a #/ q_/=02Q0U>#|Lod. 9i HW?n9*K$kBOQiBo1d\QlQ%AAW\gQV#j^KRmEB^]L6Rw4muu.G]a>[U/h;@ip|=PS[nyfGI0YD+FK:or+:=y&4i'kvC Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-Person Stag Hunt Dilemmas To begin exploring this, I now look to the literature on arms control and coordination. The matrix above provides one example. The stag hunt differs from the prisoner's dilemma in that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria:[2] one where both players cooperate, and one where both players defect. In recent times, more doctrinal exceptions to Article 2(4) such as anticipatory self defence (especially after the events of 9/11) and humanitarian intervention. As an advocate of structural realism, Gray[45] questions the role of arms control, as he views the balance of power as a self-sufficient and self-perpetuating system of international security that is more preferable. [17] Michele Bertoncello and Dominik Wee, Ten ways autonomous driving could redefine the automotive world, Mcikinsey&Company, June 2015, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/ten-ways-autonomous-driving-could-redefine-the-automotive-world (suggesting that driverless cars could reduce traffic fataltiies by up to 90 percent). Therefore, if it is likely that both actors perceive to be in a state of Prisoners Dilemma when deciding whether to agree on AI, strategic resources should be especially allocated to addressing this vulnerability. Here, we have the formation of a modest social contract. One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. Finally, there are a plethora of other assuredly relevant factors that this theory does not account for or fully consider such as multiple iterations of game playing, degrees of perfect information, or how other diplomacy-affecting spheres (economic policy, ideology, political institutional setup, etc.) Throughout history, armed force has been a ubiquitous characteristic of the relations between independent polities, be they tribes, cities, nation-states or empires.
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